Säkerhetspodcasten #107 - Zoz Brooks
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Bomber och granater! I dagens intervjuavsnitt pratar Peter och Rikard med Zoz Brooks. De diskuterar massa kreativa metoder för att destruera data.
Inspelat: 2017-09-29. Längd: 00:19:00.
AI transkribering
AI försöker förstå oss… Ha överseende med galna feltranskriberingar.
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Välkomna till den här korta intervjun som har blivit tillbaka av Säkerhetssäkerheten och Säkerhetssäkerheten.
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Vi har intervjuat språkarna under avsnittet och nu har vi Saaz Brooks här med oss.
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Han har just tillverkat en fantastisk och spektakulär tal om hur man förstör data.
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Jag tänkte att vi kunde nämna dig för Doktor Destruct eller något sådant.
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Det har en fin ring till det och jag är en doktor.
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Jag tror att du är en villain i något.
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Så du är doktor i fysik eller kemi?
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Elektrisk ingenjör och komputervetenskap.
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I robotik.
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Det är oroligt.
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Jag tycker att robotar är ganska coola.
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Det är det jag har studerat.
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Inte i robotik men i elektrik.
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I elektrisk ingenjör.
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Innan vi går in på vad du pratade om så vill vi fråga dig hur du kom in i säkerhet och den här området.
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Jag arbetar mest av tiden i området.
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Det är bara en vanlig intresse.
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Men jag har alltid varit en hackare.
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Jag vill alltid veta hur saker fungerar, ta dem bort och använda dem
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i sätt som aldrig var förväntat.
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Ibland får du platser som du inte ska gå.
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Eller gör saker som du inte ska göra.
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Ibland är det bara för att kunna se hur det fungerar.
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Att kunna använda det i dina egna projekt.
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Utifrån min ursäkt.
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Ja, jag tror att du kan säga det.
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Så om vi pratar om hackning.
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Vad är den coolaste hacken i historien?
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I historien?
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Det är en svår fråga.
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För hackning är något som är inseparabelt från teknologi.
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Och teknologin är alltid förändrad.
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Så jag tror att det är svårt att ta bort vad som är bäst.
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Men coola saker fortsätter att hända hela tiden.
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Jag tror att historiskt talat är telefonfreakning,
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hela den generella naturen av telefonfreakning,
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är den coolaste.
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För på den tiden…
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Ja, på den tiden var telefonsystemet,
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den internationella telefonsystemet,
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den mest komplicerade maskin som människor någonsin har byggt.
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Det var helt fantastiskt.
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Och alla de här människorna hade att förstå hur det fungerade
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med väldigt lite insidig information.
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Och hur man får den att respondera till sina ord.
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Så det är lite som internet, men fundamentalt lite annorlunda
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i tanke på dokumentationen som var tillgänglig.
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Och att med internet kan man göra allt.
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Det är hela målet.
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Men telefonsystemet var inte designat för att göra något annorlunda än rätten.
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Men folk använde det för alla typer av galna saker.
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Jag skulle säga att telefonfreakning är en cool område.
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Men tidigare…
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Det är mycket bra saker som kommer ut hela tiden.
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Och två tidigare exempel
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är den personen som uppfattade hur man kan hacka
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Onitys hotelldörrklockar.
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För det är ett exempel på en superhögimpakt hack.
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Med ganska vanlig hardware.
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Han kompromiserade lockar över hela världen.
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Och det är inte så lätt att göra med fysiska lockar.
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Men elektroniska lockar ger dig chansen
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och kan förstöra allt.
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Det var en cool fråga på Defqon i år som jag gillade.
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Min mamma frågade mig efteråt.
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Kan du bygga en av dessa för mig?
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Jag har en som jag behöver öppna.
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En person som har byggt en autosäkerhetshackare.
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Autodialer är ingenting nytt.
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Men hans tjej hade givit honom en säkerhetshackare.
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Vi vet inte vad som finns i den.
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Men jag tror att jag kan bygga den.
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Och han använde robotikpartier för barn.
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För att bygga en autosäkerhetshackare.
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Men det var en riktigt fin hack.
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Jag har autosäkerhetshackar när folk demonstrerar
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att öppna dem med en potatis.
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Det är som…
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Okej, det finns en förklaring till detta.
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Men det är ändå så dumt och så coolt
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att man bara kan smäcka en potatis i en säkerhetshackare
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innan den öppnas.
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Det är det ultimata.
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Det finns inget som är mer lågt tekniskt än en potatis.
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Kinetiska attacker.
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Avmärkt.
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Din språk idag för dig var om det om att
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löpa data på ett灰.
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Du pratade om utmaningen att löpa data
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Det är lite som i en Mythbusters-mål, att blåsa upp harddriven.
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Jag har känt att du har en väldigt låg definition av kontainerad.
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Det här beror mycket på min erfarenhet och de människor jag arbetade med.
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Och vår anledning till om det var möjligt.
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För vi gick inte helt till proof of concept.
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Men jag är ganska säker på att vi kunde bygga något som innehåller de originella specifikationerna.
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Coolare hardware och extrema metoder.
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En U är nära tre inchar.
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Och nära tre inchar av rejäl stål är en ganska seriös slugg att konfina något med.
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Jag tänkte på…
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...destruktionen.
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Det såg ut som att du hade mycket ro med att göra alla dessa erfarenheter.
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Men vad…
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...vad gjorde dig till den här utmaningen i första stället?
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Jag fick idén från en Defqon-tal som jag hade sett några år senare.
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Den var gjord av Divian Alam och Bruce Potter.
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De var båda riktigt roliga, det var en riktigt rolig tal.
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Men i slutändan, det gjorde mig tänka.
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Och vissa av de bästa talen gör det.
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De gör dig tänka, hur skulle jag uppmärksamma detta?
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För de försökte inte allt.
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Och jag är lite…
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Jag är lite unikt situerad i att jag har riktigt bra kontakter i explosiv…
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...i olika explosiv- och pyrotechnik-relaterade industrier.
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Så jag kände att jag kunde göra den här typen av arbete.
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Och som jag sa i talet, jag hade också tänkt länge om 3D-printing av höga explosiv.
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Och jag ville göra det också.
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Så de motivationerna kom ihop och jag tänkte, låt oss göra detta.
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Låt oss bara stoppa med att tala om det och tänka om det.
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Låt oss faktiskt göra det hända.
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Coolt.
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Och ha lite ro med det.
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Ja.
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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Men…
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careful person when it comes to this type of stuff
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and especially
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the high explosives work
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we actually did that under the supervision of the local
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bomb squad in Colorado
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so we had a police officer
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with us the whole time and
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there was no way, as well as people
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who were licensed to
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handle and use high explosives
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so there was no way that any corners
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were going to be cut on that work
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in terms of safety, so we were very
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cautious about everything, all those shots
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were done with us
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over
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like a hill
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of earth and behind a vehicle
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so there was no direct line that a
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fragment could travel
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we did everything by the book
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and that wasn’t
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there’s no book for thermite and stuff like that
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so the earlier experiments were
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a little bit more goofy
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but we still followed appropriate safety
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protocols to make sure that no one was ever in
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any kind of serious danger
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Your presentation contains
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some very spectacular
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high frame rate footage
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you weren’t afraid of
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putting expensive equipment
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close to these explosions
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Certainly
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the owners of that expensive
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equipment were concerned
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but once again, we just did everything properly
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because when I set out to do
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this work, I said right from the beginning
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it’s really important that we get
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some high speed footage of this
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so that the audience can really appreciate it
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and so that we can also see
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what’s going on
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so I knew from the beginning
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I was going to need to use these cameras
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that cost $25,000 or more
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so you just don’t take risks
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so we actually
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I didn’t show it in the presentation
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but we built
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protective enclosures for all the cameras
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the only camera actually that wasn’t protected
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was my camera, which I put on a tripod
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and I just was like, well, if it gets hit
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it gets hit, I’m willing to lose it
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but the other ones were in
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metal ammunition boxes
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with bulletproof lecterns
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and shields on them
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so we just, you know
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I told the people
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if we break the camera
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I’ll pay for it
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and I didn’t want to be liable for $25,000
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so we did everything right
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Yeah, it was 100,000 frames per second footage
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and that was on Phantom camera or something
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That’s actually beyond a Phantom
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Yeah, so actually that footage right at the end
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of the can crushes
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that was something we shot for a
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Discovery Channel TV show called Time Warp
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which I was a segment producer on
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so we had done a big sequence for that show
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on high voltage things
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and some of it made it to air
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and some of it didn’t
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so one of the main reasons that I included that in there
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was I just wanted people to see
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how crazy that was
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because it was never in the show
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I don’t think
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and we shot all the footage
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so I managed to get hold of the footage
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and put it in there because
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they, uh
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it’s just so cool, right?
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to use electricity to just smash a can like that
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and so that stuff was shot on a camera called a Photron
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SA-1 or SA-2
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and those things are half a million dollar cameras
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but yeah, so I couldn’t have even afforded to rent those
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but I had that footage anyway from Time Warp
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Cool
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Anyway, in the beginning you were talking about
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governments trying to collect
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fragments of hard drives
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and trying to extract information from those
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really, I mean
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in my experience
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once a hard drive has been
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physically deformed
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it is very, very
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implausible that someone would be able to extract information from that
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so
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have you heard any rumors that there actually
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is
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any technology that possibly could
275 00:11:20,660 --> 00:11:22,660
could extract information from a hard drive
276 00:11:22,660 --> 00:11:25,660
let’s say that you punch a nail through?
277 00:11:25,660 --> 00:11:26,660
Yeah, so
278 00:11:26,660 --> 00:11:28,660
that’s a really interesting question
279 00:11:28,660 --> 00:11:30,660
and it’s something that
280 00:11:30,660 --> 00:11:32,660
anyone who does know the answer to
281 00:11:32,660 --> 00:11:34,660
isn’t allowed to talk about it, right?
282 00:11:34,660 --> 00:11:37,660
So, I guess what I have on that subject is
283 00:11:37,660 --> 00:11:38,660
technically rumor
284 00:11:38,660 --> 00:11:40,660
it’s second hand information
285 00:11:40,660 --> 00:11:42,660
but it came from
286 00:11:42,660 --> 00:11:43,660
as I said in the talk
287 00:11:43,660 --> 00:11:46,660
a guy who was recovering
288 00:11:46,660 --> 00:11:48,660
information
289 00:11:48,660 --> 00:11:50,660
intelligence information in Iraq
290 00:11:50,660 --> 00:11:52,660
after the American invasion
291 00:11:52,660 --> 00:11:54,660
and he was under instructions from the NSA
292 00:11:54,660 --> 00:11:57,660
to collect and send to them any
293 00:11:57,660 --> 00:11:59,660
storage material
294 00:11:59,660 --> 00:12:01,660
that had not been both
295 00:12:01,660 --> 00:12:04,660
crushed or shredded and burned
296 00:12:04,660 --> 00:12:06,660
and they told him
297 00:12:06,660 --> 00:12:08,660
because, you know, they didn’t want to
298 00:12:08,660 --> 00:12:10,660
presumably they don’t waste this guy’s time
299 00:12:10,660 --> 00:12:11,660
so they told him
300 00:12:11,660 --> 00:12:13,660
if you find a disk that’s been crushed
301 00:12:13,660 --> 00:12:15,660
or cut in half, whatever
302 00:12:15,660 --> 00:12:18,660
send it to us because it’s still useful to us
303 00:12:18,660 --> 00:12:19,660
so
304 00:12:19,660 --> 00:12:21,660
the implication is that they have
305 00:12:21,660 --> 00:12:23,660
methods of recovery and
306 00:12:23,660 --> 00:12:25,660
I, you know, as a robotics person
307 00:12:25,660 --> 00:12:27,660
I can think of ways that I would approach that problem
308 00:12:27,660 --> 00:12:28,660
right, so
309 00:12:28,660 --> 00:12:30,660
I could think of designing a system that
310 00:12:30,660 --> 00:12:32,660
took a platter and
311 00:12:32,660 --> 00:12:34,660
3D imaged it to get
312 00:12:34,660 --> 00:12:36,660
the exact curvature and then swept
313 00:12:36,660 --> 00:12:38,660
a robot arm
314 00:12:38,660 --> 00:12:40,660
with a reed head over the top of that
315 00:12:40,660 --> 00:12:41,660
at the reed height
316 00:12:41,660 --> 00:12:42,660
it’s totally feasible to do
317 00:12:42,660 --> 00:12:43,660
from a control perspective
318 00:12:43,660 --> 00:12:44,660
and
319 00:12:44,660 --> 00:12:46,660
modern drives are so data dense
320 00:12:46,660 --> 00:12:48,660
yeah, that’s another thing
321 00:12:48,660 --> 00:12:49,660
a small piece
322 00:12:49,660 --> 00:12:50,660
you know, still would
323 00:12:50,660 --> 00:12:52,660
potentially hold a lot of data
324 00:12:52,660 --> 00:12:53,660
like an individual file
325 00:12:53,660 --> 00:12:55,660
could reside in a very small piece of disk
326 00:12:55,660 --> 00:12:56,660
but on the other hand
327 00:12:56,660 --> 00:12:58,660
I mean, the data density itself
328 00:12:58,660 --> 00:13:00,660
poses a problem
329 00:13:00,660 --> 00:13:02,660
in recovery because you
330 00:13:02,660 --> 00:13:04,660
you don’t have tracks anymore
331 00:13:04,660 --> 00:13:06,660
like you did on the old type of hard drives
332 00:13:06,660 --> 00:13:08,660
I mean, you’re
333 00:13:08,660 --> 00:13:10,660
relying on
334 00:13:10,660 --> 00:13:12,660
magnetic information
335 00:13:12,660 --> 00:13:14,660
and
336 00:13:14,660 --> 00:13:16,660
it’s actually like a voice coil
337 00:13:16,660 --> 00:13:18,660
that positions the
338 00:13:18,660 --> 00:13:20,660
reed head on the platter
339 00:13:20,660 --> 00:13:22,660
so I would think
340 00:13:22,660 --> 00:13:24,660
it would be
341 00:13:24,660 --> 00:13:26,660
near impossible, at least in
342 00:13:26,660 --> 00:13:28,660
for a civilian
343 00:13:28,660 --> 00:13:30,660
authority
344 00:13:30,660 --> 00:13:32,660
but how many tens of millions
345 00:13:32,660 --> 00:13:34,660
of dollars
346 00:13:34,660 --> 00:13:36,660
if you threw that at the problem
347 00:13:36,660 --> 00:13:38,660
could it become tractable, right?
348 00:13:38,660 --> 00:13:40,660
because the intelligence budget in the United States
349 00:13:40,660 --> 00:13:42,660
is many hundreds of millions of dollars
350 00:13:42,660 --> 00:13:44,660
and I mean, it doesn’t need to mean that
351 00:13:44,660 --> 00:13:46,660
they think it’s
352 00:13:46,660 --> 00:13:48,660
recoverable today
353 00:13:48,660 --> 00:13:50,660
when you go by military and they
354 00:13:50,660 --> 00:13:52,660
have 30 years
355 00:13:52,660 --> 00:13:54,660
expectancies and so
356 00:13:54,660 --> 00:13:56,660
it could be
357 00:13:56,660 --> 00:13:58,660
they expect that in the future we might
358 00:13:58,660 --> 00:14:00,660
have technology that could recover something
359 00:14:00,660 --> 00:14:02,660
yeah, and it could be like
360 00:14:02,660 --> 00:14:04,660
maybe they do the first
361 00:14:04,660 --> 00:14:06,660
triage and
362 00:14:06,660 --> 00:14:08,660
these are very unlikely
363 00:14:08,660 --> 00:14:10,660
we ever can recover
364 00:14:10,660 --> 00:14:12,660
and these are slightly
365 00:14:12,660 --> 00:14:14,660
possible that if we throw a lot of money on it
366 00:14:14,660 --> 00:14:16,660
and then if they get over intelligence
367 00:14:16,660 --> 00:14:18,660
that says
368 00:14:18,660 --> 00:14:20,660
drives recovery in this area might be
369 00:14:20,660 --> 00:14:22,660
very very important
370 00:14:22,660 --> 00:14:24,660
then they might push
371 00:14:24,660 --> 00:14:26,660
those extremely expensive
372 00:14:26,660 --> 00:14:28,660
measures on those particular
373 00:14:28,660 --> 00:14:30,660
disks, so if they
374 00:14:30,660 --> 00:14:32,660
recovered 100,000 badly damaged
375 00:14:32,660 --> 00:14:34,660
drives, maybe just five
376 00:14:34,660 --> 00:14:36,660
actually went through the most expensive
377 00:14:36,660 --> 00:14:38,660
most complex procedures
378 00:14:38,660 --> 00:14:40,660
and a lot of it just depends on
379 00:14:40,660 --> 00:14:42,660
what’s your personal
380 00:14:42,660 --> 00:14:44,660
risk comfortability
381 00:14:44,660 --> 00:14:46,660
if I was
382 00:14:46,660 --> 00:14:48,660
if my life was
383 00:14:48,660 --> 00:14:50,660
in danger from the material on those drives
384 00:14:50,660 --> 00:14:52,660
or if my freedom was in danger
385 00:14:52,660 --> 00:14:54,660
if I was a criminal running a darknet market
386 00:14:54,660 --> 00:14:56,660
or something like that, then I would be very paranoid
387 00:14:56,660 --> 00:14:58,660
even excessively
388 00:14:58,660 --> 00:15:00,660
so, you know, it’s like
389 00:15:00,660 --> 00:15:02,660
why take a risk you don’t have to
390 00:15:02,660 --> 00:15:04,660
that’s true, I mean
391 00:15:04,660 --> 00:15:06,660
you can never be too sure
392 00:15:06,660 --> 00:15:08,660
and of course
393 00:15:08,660 --> 00:15:10,660
my experience is from
394 00:15:10,660 --> 00:15:12,660
the field of forensics and
395 00:15:12,660 --> 00:15:14,660
there you have conventional methods
396 00:15:14,660 --> 00:15:16,660
which means that
397 00:15:16,660 --> 00:15:18,660
a damaged drive or
398 00:15:18,660 --> 00:15:20,660
damaged read heads or
399 00:15:20,660 --> 00:15:22,660
something like that, that’s
400 00:15:22,660 --> 00:15:24,660
completely possible to recover
401 00:15:24,660 --> 00:15:26,660
but it’s
402 00:15:26,660 --> 00:15:28,660
it becomes
403 00:15:28,660 --> 00:15:30,660
almost impossible
404 00:15:30,660 --> 00:15:32,660
if the platters
405 00:15:32,660 --> 00:15:34,660
are damaged or somehow
406 00:15:34,660 --> 00:15:36,660
physically
407 00:15:36,660 --> 00:15:38,660
have any defects on them
408 00:15:38,660 --> 00:15:40,660
because they’re going to destroy the equipment
409 00:15:40,660 --> 00:15:42,660
that you’re using to recover the data
410 00:15:42,660 --> 00:15:44,660
but yeah
411 00:15:44,660 --> 00:15:46,660
I mean given infinite
412 00:15:46,660 --> 00:15:48,660
budgets
413 00:15:48,660 --> 00:15:50,660
it might be possible
414 00:15:50,660 --> 00:15:52,660
possibly plausible
415 00:15:52,660 --> 00:15:54,660
at least
416 00:15:54,660 --> 00:15:56,660
I mean I think it’s an interesting thought experiment
417 00:15:56,660 --> 00:15:58,660
so
418 00:15:58,660 --> 00:16:00,660
anyway, thank you for
419 00:16:00,660 --> 00:16:02,660
taking this time to
420 00:16:02,660 --> 00:16:04,660
talk to us during this interview
421 00:16:04,660 --> 00:16:06,660
you’re welcome, thanks for having me
422 00:16:06,660 --> 00:16:08,660
and we’ll
423 00:16:08,660 --> 00:16:10,660
go down and listen to some of the
424 00:16:10,660 --> 00:16:12,660
lightning talks
425 00:16:12,660 --> 00:16:14,660
I’m psyched
426 00:16:14,660 --> 00:16:16,660
what kind of destruction
427 00:16:16,660 --> 00:16:18,660
or something
428 00:16:18,660 --> 00:16:20,660
you would like to do
429 00:16:20,660 --> 00:16:22,660
that you haven’t done yet
430 00:16:22,660 --> 00:16:24,660
what’s in life
431 00:16:24,660 --> 00:16:26,660
is there anything you have
432 00:16:26,660 --> 00:16:28,660
imagined you would like to do
433 00:16:28,660 --> 00:16:30,660
but haven’t done yet
434 00:16:30,660 --> 00:16:32,660
since you have done bombs
435 00:16:32,660 --> 00:16:34,660
and you have done crazy physics things
436 00:16:34,660 --> 00:16:36,660
to wreck things
437 00:16:36,660 --> 00:16:38,660
is there anything you feel like
438 00:16:38,660 --> 00:16:40,660
this is the thing I haven’t tried yet
439 00:16:40,660 --> 00:16:42,660
yeah there’s a few things
440 00:16:42,660 --> 00:16:44,660
not all like straight
441 00:16:44,660 --> 00:16:46,660
destructive things
442 00:16:46,660 --> 00:16:48,660
but kind of interesting effects
443 00:16:48,660 --> 00:16:50,660
I’d like to
444 00:16:50,660 --> 00:16:52,660
that stuff at the end
445 00:16:52,660 --> 00:16:54,660
with the can crushing
446 00:16:54,660 --> 00:16:56,660
I’d be super psyched to
447 00:16:56,660 --> 00:16:58,660
try and do that at scale
448 00:16:58,660 --> 00:17:00,660
and try and do it on something the size
449 00:17:00,660 --> 00:17:02,660
and weight of a full
450 00:17:02,660 --> 00:17:04,660
five and a quarter inch hard disk
451 00:17:04,660 --> 00:17:06,660
I saw a demonstration
452 00:17:06,660 --> 00:17:08,660
I think it was physics girl on youtube
453 00:17:08,660 --> 00:17:10,660
where they took a penny
454 00:17:10,660 --> 00:17:12,660
and they did something straight
455 00:17:12,660 --> 00:17:14,660
magnetic electricity thing
456 00:17:14,660 --> 00:17:16,660
to shrink it
457 00:17:16,660 --> 00:17:18,660
yeah so that same rig
458 00:17:18,660 --> 00:17:20,660
you can also use for shrinking quarters
459 00:17:20,660 --> 00:17:22,660
and we did that also on time warp
460 00:17:22,660 --> 00:17:24,660
as part of that same shoot
461 00:17:24,660 --> 00:17:26,660
and so I have some video of that too
462 00:17:26,660 --> 00:17:28,660
at a really high frame rate
463 00:17:28,660 --> 00:17:30,660
but again it’s really hard to see what’s going on
464 00:17:30,660 --> 00:17:32,660
because at 100,000 frames per second
465 00:17:32,660 --> 00:17:34,660
it still happens in one frame
466 00:17:34,660 --> 00:17:36,660
and this coin doesn’t get a lot smaller
467 00:17:36,660 --> 00:17:38,660
it gets a little bit smaller
468 00:17:38,660 --> 00:17:40,660
so it’s not as dramatic as the can crushing
469 00:17:40,660 --> 00:17:42,660
but it’s really cool
470 00:17:42,660 --> 00:17:44,660
because no material disappears
471 00:17:44,660 --> 00:17:46,660
the coin gets a smaller diameter
472 00:17:46,660 --> 00:17:48,660
but it gets thicker
473 00:17:48,660 --> 00:17:50,660
because the material stays constant
474 00:17:50,660 --> 00:17:52,660
so you don’t think this is the new solution to data compression
475 00:17:56,660 --> 00:17:58,660
if matter is data
476 00:17:58,660 --> 00:18:00,660
there’s no compression
477 00:18:00,660 --> 00:18:02,660
same amount of matter is there
478 00:18:02,660 --> 00:18:04,660
but one thing that’s cool about that
479 00:18:04,660 --> 00:18:06,660
if you take a euro coin
480 00:18:06,660 --> 00:18:08,660
a bimetallic coin
481 00:18:08,660 --> 00:18:10,660
and you shrink it
482 00:18:10,660 --> 00:18:12,660
they shrink at different rates
483 00:18:12,660 --> 00:18:14,660
it’s a problem actually
484 00:18:14,660 --> 00:18:16,660
that I shrunk on a quarter shrinker
485 00:18:16,660 --> 00:18:18,660
and now it’s two separate pieces
486 00:18:18,660 --> 00:18:20,660
it would be fun
487 00:18:20,660 --> 00:18:22,660
now they decommissioned the high voltage lab
488 00:18:22,660 --> 00:18:24,660
at Chalmers University
489 00:18:24,660 --> 00:18:26,660
but it would be cool
490 00:18:26,660 --> 00:18:28,660
to get access to that equipment
491 00:18:28,660 --> 00:18:30,660
and see what you can do with a hard drive
492 00:18:30,660 --> 00:18:32,660
and any of these things
493 00:18:32,660 --> 00:18:34,660
are totally accessible to the hobbyists
494 00:18:34,660 --> 00:18:36,660
they’re just expensive
495 00:18:36,660 --> 00:18:38,660
buying a big bank of pulse capacitors
496 00:18:38,660 --> 00:18:40,660
there’s a fair outlay of cash
497 00:18:40,660 --> 00:18:42,660
to do that
498 00:18:42,660 --> 00:18:44,660
but you can do it
499 00:18:44,660 --> 00:18:46,660
cool
500 00:18:46,660 --> 00:18:48,660
thank you for giving this interview
501 00:18:48,660 --> 00:18:50,660
and have fun at the rest of the conference
502 00:18:50,660 --> 00:18:52,660
thank you
503 00:18:52,660 --> 00:18:54,660
cheers